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The United States Senate

R3014

Report of Proceedings

Hearing held before

Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities

Thursday, May 6, 1976

Washington, D.C.

(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over to the Committee for destruction)

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EXECUTIVE SESSION

- - -

Thursday, May 6, 1976

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United States Senate,
Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to
Intelligence Activities,
Washington, D. C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:40 o'clock p.m., in Room 608, the Carroll Arms Hotel, the Honorable Richard S. Schweiker presiding.

Present: Senator Schweiker (presiding).

Also present: Jim Johnston and Paul Wallach, Professional Staff Members.

PROCEEDINGS

Senator Schweiker. I guess we will swear you in, so if you will stand up and raise your right hand, do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Halley. Yes, I do.

Senator Schweiker. Be seated.

Mr. Johnston. Would you state for the record your full name?

TESTIMONY OF ROBERT G. HALLEY

ACCOMPANIED BY JOHN RIGALL AND SEYMOUR R. BOLTEN

Mr. Halley. My name is Robert G. Halley.

Mr. Johnston. And I understand that is an alias and your true identity will be preserved by the Agency.

Mr. Halley. That is correct.

Mr. Johnston. Mr. Bolten, would you state your full name?

Mr. Bolten. Seymour Bolten, Seymour R. Bolten.

Mr. Johnston. And John, the alias you are testifying under?

Mr. Rigall. John Rigall, R-i-g-a-l-l.

Mr. Johnston. And Mr. Bolten and Mr. Rigal, would you state your capacity in this session today?

Mr. Bolten. I am chief of the Review Staff of the CIA, and responsible for dealings with the Senate Select Committee.

Mr. Rigall. I am Special Assistant to the DDO, sitting in here as an alternate monitor.

Mr. Johnston. And the discussion that has taken place prior to going on the record today basically has resulted in a decision to have Mr. Bolten and Mr. Rigall attend as monitors to this session, and do you understand that, Mr. Halley?

Mr. Halley. Yes, I do.

Mr. Johnston. Mr. Halley, what was your capacity with the Agency in November, 1963?

Mr. Halley. In November, 1963, I was the Chief of Sta...

of the CIA operation that was based in Miami, Florida, targeted as its primarily responsibility for the Cuban operation.

Mr. Johnston. Mr. Wallach has reminded me to remind you of a procedural matter which, you understand you have the right to counsel.

Mr. Halley. Yes, I do.

Mr. Johnston. And you understand you have a right not to answer questions if you don't wish to, or not to answer questions until you consult with Counsel, is that correct?

Mr. Halley. That is correct.

Mr. Johnston. And you are appearing here voluntarily without counsel.

Mr. Halley. That is correct.

Mr. Johnston. And going back to substantive questions, how long did you remain as Chief of Station?

What were the dates of your service?

Mr. Halley. Well, I arrived, or became involved in the Cuban operations in the early 1962, and I stayed there until approximately June of 1965.

Senator Schweiker. What month again in '62?

Mr. Halley. Early '62. I didn't give you the month, Senator, because I originally came down to Florida to conduct a survey of this operation to see what possibilities could be carried out in terms of the collection of intelligence. I later filed a report on it, and I was later assigned down to

Senator Schweiker. And this was called JMWAVE, was it?

Mr. Halley. That is the cryptonym that the Agency used for the Miami station.

Senator SChweiker. And to whom in that chain of command at the CIA did you report when you were the operating head?

Mr. Halley. There were different people at different times. When I first went to Miami, the task force commander wa Mr. William Harvey. He reported then to the DDP, who reported to the Director of Central Intelligence. At a later point in the operation, Mr. Harvey moved on to other tasks, and Mr. Fitzgerald became the chief of that particular unit, and then after Mr. Fitzgerald, Mr. Hart was the head of that particular unit.

And between Harvey and Fitzgerald, I think there was a short period of time when a fellow by the name of Bruce Cheev was the acting chief of that particular unit, or the chief. I have forgotten the exact arrangement there.

Senator Schweiker. Sometime during this period did it change its title from Task Force W to SAS, is that correct or not correct, or do I have it mixed up?

Mr. Halley. My recollection of that chronology was the it was first called SAS and then became Task Force W, and th became integrated back into WH Division, which was the Weste Hemisphere Division.

Senator Schweiker. SAS preceded Task Force W?

Mr. Halley. Yes. That's off the top of my head. That's my recollection of it.

Mr. Johnston. Just for the record, I think it was the other way around. Task Force W was first and SAS was second.

Senator Schweiker. But in sum and substance your duties were basically the same, whether it was Task Force W or SAS under Harvey and Fitzgerald, was that not true?

Mr. Halley. Well, I think you have to break this period up into two phases, Senator. The early phase, 1962, was focused on coming up with an appraisal of what kind of an operation could be run against Cuba in the context which existed at that time, in other words, after the Bay of Pigs, after the post mortems had been conducted. The Administration at the time decided that they wanted to take another look at Cuba as an intelligence and national security problem. Therefore, an assessment was to be made in the early period of time as to what kind of an operation could be run in pursuit of U.S. policy objectives, which was to see if Fidel Castro's government could be removed. And when that assessment was conducted as to what kind of intelligence operations could be conducted, what kind of paramilitary or other operations could be run, that was an initial phase, and that phase was approved and put into effect, but as that operation was being put into effect the missile crisis came upon us, so that that was not really carried to its logical conclusion because the operation

then shifted.

Senator Schweiker. After October of '62?

Mr. Halley. No, prior to October of '62, because the Cuban crisis was in October of '62, but the buildup preceded it, and our operations which were collecting intelligence in Cuba detected this buildup as it was unfolding. Therefore, the national priority became now how do you take action against Fidel Castro, but what is the nature of this Soviet buildup. And therefore the operation changed.

Then after the Cuban missile crisis of October of 1962, the problem became one of monitoring the Soviet disengagement from Cuba, and then there was another phase after that when the Soviets were out, Castro was clearly recognized as the established power in Cuba, and the problem became one of looking at Cuba in the context of was there some other way to get a political change in Cuba other than by military action or by paramilitary action. In other words, the emphasis shifted to looking at the Castro military establishment to see if a coup could be pulled from within, to see if economic pressures could be put on the Castro regime.

So the tasking of this particular unit did change, and change of nuances and degrees during this period, but in our professional sense it was focused on the Cuban targets. So in that sense you are correct, but it did go through various changes as events changed.

Senator Schweiker. What was the relationship of your station and your assignment to General Lansdale? What role did he play?

Mr. Halley. Well, in the early days, in the early period of 1962, General Lansdale was a member of a group that was looking at the basic problem of what could be done against the Cuban activity. This came up in one of my previous conversations with Mr. Baron.

Senator Schweiker. Are you talking about something we call Operation MONGOOSE, are we talking about Special Group Augmented, or what are we talking about?

Mr. Halley. Well, when I first came into this activity in 1962, the principal people that seemed to be involved with it at that time were Robert Kennedy, General Lansdale, Dick Helms, and William Harvey, and the group of Kennedy, Lansdale and Helms were providing, if you will, the guidance and the direction as to where this thing should go in the early days.

Shortly after the operation was established and I was in Miami, Lansdale seems to have faded out of this particular picture, and I was not involved in the Washington nuances of this, so I am not clear as to exactly what was the reason for his departure from this particular scene.

Senator Schweiker. And was that -- do you remember the cryptonym, Operation MONGOOSE?

Mr. Halley. I've heard the cryptonym Operation MONGOOSE,

but that didn't impact on my life at that particular time.

Senator Schweiker. All right.

Mr. Johnston. Moving to the time of the Kennedy assassination, were you Chief of Station and in Miami when the President was assassinated?

Mr. Halley. Yes, I was the Chief of Station and I was in Miami.

Mr. Johnston. You were physically in Miami on November 22nd.

Mr. Halley. Yes, I was.

Mr. Johnston. Did you receive any orders through CIA channels to conduct an investigation in any fashion into the assassination of the President?

Mr. Halley. Well, my recollection of that was that we had requests for name traces at the time that Oswald was arrested, and that was our contribution to the investigation.

Mr. Johnston. Did you receive any order in the form of a cable or any other fashion to conduct an investigation?

Mr. Halley. I don't recall receiving one, but if you showed me a cable, I would have to comment on it. In other words this was in 1963. This is 1976, and as you know from my record, I've been in an awful lot of high volume projects since that time, and I don't think it is likely that I would recall a specific cable, you know, on a particular day. I mean, I have been in Berlin, Laos, Vietnam. My life has been active, a...

therefore I do not recall a specific cable. If you've got a cable, I'd be glad to comment on it.

Mr. Johnston. Well, I don't have one, and I'm asking you whether one would exist.

Mr. Halley. I don't recall one.

Mr. Johnston. And your judgment would be that there was not a cable ordering an investigation.

Mr. Halley. I can't say that. I can only say that I don't recall one, but I do recall that at a later point, once Oswald was detained by the police and there was some investigative material emanating from that, we participated in name trace activity of whatever was sent to us at that time from Washington, because I do recall that at the time that the name traces were conducted, that one of the Cuban groups that we were in touch with at DRE, they did come up with a tape of a debate which had taken place between Oswald and some member of the DRE in New Orleans, and you know, that sort of sticks in my mind as an event of that particular time. And w commented on it, and as I recall, forwarded the tapes to Washington.

Senator Schweiker. That was Bringuier's group, was it not?

Mr. Halley. That was the DRE, the Direccion Revoluci

Senators Schweiker. Wasn't Carlos Bringuier -- maybe I'm pronouncing it wrong, involved in that, and wasn't he

associated with you folks at that time?

Mr. Halley. Well, I don't recall that specific name, Senator, at this time.

We did have a relationship with the DRE. We did deal with a number of their top leaders.

Mr. Johnston. Let me come back to that later.

Did you receive any orders not to investigate an area, or not to conduct an investigation of any kind?

Mr. Halley. No, I don't recall receiving any such orders.

Mr. Johnston. At this time period, November 22nd, November 23rd, 1963, what was your capability in regard to conducting an investigation among Cuban exiles, and with Cuban sources?

Mr. Halley. Well, in relationship to Cubans living in the United States, I would say that our capability was quite good.

Now, if you are referring to our capability to conduct an investigation in Cuba, I would have to say it was limited. have to know where specifically you are referring to. In other words, if you're talking in the area --

Mr. Johnston. First I'm talking domestically of Cuban exiles in the United States, and your answer is --

Mr. Halley. That it would have been quite good.

Mr. Johnston. Secondly, with regard to collecting intelligence as to possible Cuban involvement --

Mr. Halley. From Cuba or in Cuba?

Mr. Johnston. Any other source.

Mr. Halley. Well, if you're talking about collecting information in Cuba --

Mr. Johnston. I see.

Mr. Halley. It would then have to be focused specifically on different geographic areas. In other words, as an example, if you told me I want some information on a specific town in the province of Pinar del Rio, that probably was within our capability at that time because we had a rather extensive network in Pinar del Rio. If you had said to me, you know, in that same timeframe on this day, I want you to conduct a kind of an investigation in the province of Camaguey, I probably would have had to say, you know, we're not as well equipped, because our coverage varied from province to province.

Mr. Johnston. Did you have sources -- and I mean specifically JMWAVE station, did JMWAVE station control sources in Cuban intelligence?

Mr. Halley. I don't recall that we had any staff officer in the Cuban intelligence service under our control. We may have been involved in some double agent operations at that time, but certainly we did not have a staff officer penetration of the Cuban services.

Mr. Johnston. Did you ever receive any orders to contact whatever your contacts were in the Cuban intelligence, to

inquire about the assassination of President Kennedy?

Mr. Halley. I don't recall receiving any such instruction.

Mr. Johnston. Did that ever occur to you on your own?

Mr. Halley. Well, I think as you probably see from some of the traffic, we did come up on our own with samplings of opinion, what was happening in the Cuban community. We were reporting what was coming out of Cuba in terms of information brought by, you know, refugees, material that was being made available through people corresponding and so forth, yes, we were sensitive to that particular problem.

Mr. Johnston. But did you affirmatively go out and seek the information from sources in Cuba?

Mr. Halley. Well, to the extent that this was available to us, you know, we had lots of agents. If you're asking me did we send an SW message and task a specific agent to conduct an investigation, or did we send them a radio message or something like that, I don't recall one.

Mr. Johnston. Why didn't you do that?

Mr. Halley. My recollection of this is that we felt that the nature of our capability was to simply respond to what we were able to obtain in the Miami area, and from our sources in a passive way, because this was an investigation that was being conducted in the United States with the primary responsibility with agencies other than CIA.

Mr. Johnston. I guess I don't quite understand the answer

because the CIA did have responsibility and certainly the capability to collect information from foreign countries.

Mr. Halley. Well, we had no reason at the particular time to feel that there was any kind of a case, hard information, that the Cubans were behind the assassination.

In other words, you know, at that particular period in time there were a large number of rumors, gossip, in the Cuban Community. Those that came to our attention were reported, and we tried to put them in some perspective, that is, who was the individual, what access did he have to this data and so forth.

But we had no persuasion that this was being mounted by the Cubans at that particular time.

Mr. Wallach. I would like to ask a couple of questions by way of background and let Jim go right back to his line of questioning.

Taking the period as exemplary, October of 1963 --

Mr. Halley. October of '63, okay.

Mr. Wallach. Which I take it would be fairly indicative of what was going on in May, June, July and August of the same year, I want to pick a fairly standard month for that period.

Mr. Halley. Uh-huh.

Mr. Wallach. Before the assassination.

It's my understanding that in addition to getting posit

intelligence from refugees, etc., coming to this country, that your station did operate agents and did have sources, whatever terms you want to use, inside Cuba, is that correct?

Mr. Hailey. Yes, we did have sources inside Cuba.

Mr. Wallach. Could you briefly for the record --

(Pause)

Mr. Wallach. What I'd like to do very briefly for the record, as you know, I think you had an interview with Mr. Baron and went into it with you, but very briefly describe generally the type of operations that your station was conducting vis-a-vis Cuba.

Mr. Hailey. Well, in the first instance we were engaged in foreign intelligence collection activities, that is, trying to establish information which related to the plans, intentions and capabilities of the Cuban government. We were also involved in counterintelligence operations, that is, trying to figure out what the Cubans were doing in terms of their intelligence operations in the United States, or through the United States into Central and Latin America. We were also involved in propaganda operations against Cuba, and covert action in the sense of trying to establish contact with dissident military personalities in Cuba.

Mr. Wallach. Without naming names, did you in the time period I've been talking about, October of 1963, have either sources or agents fairly highly placed within the Cuban

government?

Mr. Halley. I don't think -- there I'd have to get a better definition from you of what is highly placed. If you are talking about Fidel Castro and his immediate entourage --

Mr. Wallach. People who could possibly have been in meetings or dinner with Castro, or meetings with Castro. I don't know enough about how Castro operated.

Mr. Halley. I would say if you are talking about somebody who was a member of his immediate entourage and who was dealing with him in a governmental sense, then the answer is no, but we did have people who were on the periphery of this. That is, they wouldn't have been major participants, but they would have been in social contact with Castro or members of his entourage.

Mr. Wallach. How about persons within the DGI, whatever the correct name for Cuban intelligence is.

Mr. Halley. Well, again as I mentioned earlier, we had no staff officer penetration of the Cuban intelligence service. We had some reporting on people who were in touch with various leaders in the Cuban intelligence, and it was all in social or family or other context that these people were reporting on.

Mr. Wallach. Do you recall at any time in 1962 or 196[illegible] the fact being brought to your attention that certain Cuban agents out of New York City were actually beginning to run

assassination plots against Cuban exile leaders down in Miami?

Mr. Halley. Out of New York? No, I don't recall that. One thing, just before we leave this, so we don't have an incomplete record, you asked me the other kinds of operations that we were running. We were running a full scope of para-military operations against Cuba. That is, we were putting people back into Cuba who may have come from a particular province, and who then went into the bush and lived in the bush, and we kept them supplied with food, arms, basic equipment. We did have radio contact with them. We were involved in raids against the Cuban coast, we were involved in putting caches into the Cuban coast.

Senator Schweiker. Does that finish your point?

Mr. Halley. Yes, sir, that's roughly it.

Senator Schweiker. Following up this other question, was any one part of your job plugging intelligence leaks at this given time?

Was there any concern during your timeframe that you were involved in Cuban operations of intelligence leaks from our country to theirs through the Cuban intelligence system?

Was this ever a consideration or priority of you as Station Chief?

Mr. Halley. Yes, in terms of -- well, yes, the answer to that is yes. Now, let me elaborate on it.

We had a jurisdictional problem. For instance, a Cuban agent detected in the United States or being suspected of being a Cuban agent would have been a case that we would have had to have coordinated with the FBI, and essentially the FBI took primary action on this.

I recall one case where we detected a Cuban agent in the United States, and the case was transferred to the Bureau and it involved a fundamental jurisdictional issue, which was clearly the Bureau's right to take that particular case over. So in that sense, the primary responsibility in the Miami area in the counterintelligence sense that you are discussing, Senator, would have rested with the Bureau.

Senator Schweiker. Did you ever attempt to find a leak by placing one of our agents into the system to plug a leak? I mean, was it ever that magnitude of concern attached?

Mr. Hailey. No, I don't recall that kind of a case. In other words, I do recall cases where people came out of Cuba, gave us a story that we did not necessarily believe, where we would turn them back and send them back to Cuba, so that over a longer period of time we could determine what it is that they were really after, what they were trying to do. In other words, were they trying to come into the United States to penetrate and immigrate, were they trying to get in touch with American intelligence, and if so, why. But it was all done back into the Cuban context.

Senator Schweiker. This is a tough question to answer, but at that period of time, how successful in your opinion was the Cuban intelligence system in doing some of that penetration, and I realize that we had a lot of Cuban exiles here, and it is pretty hard to tell the players from the scorecard we are in. It is a tough relevant question, but I wonder how you would analyze it.

Mr. Halley. Well, I think it would be fair to say that given the Cuban propensity to talk -- in other words, you have to start off with a fundamental point of departure that if you get two Cubans that have got a secret, it is not going to be a secret, because they do talk, and therefore they all constantly talk.

Our biggest problem in maintaining security of our own operations, such as an infiltration operation into Cuba to put in a cache or run a commando raid or put a person back in was to maintain security. The only way we could do it would be to take all participants of that operation and take them out of the Cuban community and in fact isolate them for a week or ten days or more prior to the mounting of the operation so that they wouldn't talk, and we could know where they would be constantly, 24 hours a day. And within that milieu, I think it is safe to say that the Cuban intelligence service did have some agents and could be expected to have a general feel for the pulse of the community at that time.

Senator Schweiker. During that same time frame, or during the time frame that you were Station Chief, what are some other Cuban groups that you worked with that come to mind? I have mentioned DRE. I realize there were several different ones?

Any others particularly that were helpful and worked with you like the DRE?

Mr. Halley. Well, the DRE was the main group because what had happened is after the -- or prior to the Bay of Pigs there was a great collaboration between CIA and a number of these groups. After the Bay of Pigs, the dialogue with these groups sort of dried up, and during my tenure, the main group that we worked with in that sense as an organizational entity was the DRE because they had a lot of active, imaginative young student leaders who had contacts throughout the Western Hemisphere who were equally interested in using them in the propaganda and covert action sense in Central and Latin America as we were actually using them against Cuba itself.

Senator Schweiker. Where did Alpha 66 fit or not fit into that?

Mr. Halley. We did not have an organizational relationship with Alpha 66. Alpha 66 was in being. We monitored their activities so that we would know when they were going to [illegible] raids against Cuba. We may have had people who at one time or another were in our paramilitary teams who left us for

one reason or another and may have ended up in Alpha 66.

Senator Schweiker. We realize that one of the other intelligence agencies might have had a liaison or working operation with Alpha 66, not the CIA, is that correct?

Mr. Halley. Yes, I think -- you know, in the back of my memory I believe that one of the military services --

Senator Schweiker. Might it have been the Army Intelligence?

Mr. Halley. My recollection, it was probably a military service, and it probably was the Army, but I would have to check the record.

Senator Schweiker. We also were informed, and I just wondered if this was your recollection, that at some point some of the operations got a little bit overlapping and duplicating, and that the boats would -- I'm simplifying it of course, but that the boats weren't coordinated too well, and at one point it got to be a problem with whoever else was involved, and that finally an agreement was worked out with Army intelligence that all the boats would be supplied by CIA instead of having them sort of fly-by-nighting and possibly mess up some things because of duplication or conflict.

Do you recall any of that at all?

Mr. Halley. Well, I think there were periods when the U.S. Government was putting a clamp-down on refugee groups going out, and the whole apparatus of government, Coast Gua-

Customs, Immigration and Naturalization, FBI, CIA, were working together to try to keep these operations from going to Cuba.

In that context, the military did have some problems, but my recollection of that, Senator, is that we put them into the coordination mechanism that we had for getting boats out. I don't recall our taking their people --

Senator Schweiker. I might have stated it wrong.

What do you mean by a coordination mechanism?

Mr. Halley. Well, for instance, we had, let's say, for the month of October 1963, we would draw up an operational plan in September. In the course of that operational plan and geared to the dark of the moon, we would have a number of infiltration missions scheduled to put in caches. We'd have a number of missions scheduled to put in teams or to take people out of Cuba. We'd have a number of missions scheduled to conduct commando raids against fixed installations.

So we would draw up the schedule and coordinate the schedule with the appropriate agencies like Coast Guard or Customs so that we could move our boats in and out and not cause the U.S. Government to expend manhours and money in pursuing our boats.

Senator Schweiker. I think that is what I had in mind.

Mr. Halley. And therefore, on this schedule, when we worked this out, we therefore would tack on the military operations and work this out so that there was a central

clearinghouse, and the U. S. government had a grip on what it was doing in this clandestine field.

Senator Schweiker. To your recollection, besides Army intelligence, were there any other intelligence services that were involved to any extent with that general picture?

Mr. Halley. Well, with the mutation of that, as I recall, the Navy had some activities in and out of Guantanamo, and there were some discussions at various times on how their people in Guantanamo could be supported, and the people were going in and out of Guantanamo.

Senator Schweiker. Were the Army operations very extensive or not compared to yours?

Mr. Halley. No. Compared to ours, they were infinitesimal.

Senator Schweiker. And Navy?

Mr. Halley. Navy, as I think all of this was limited to the perimeter all around Guantanamo, and Guantanamo.

Senator Schweiker. All right.

Mr. Wallach. I just want to ask you a couple of more questions as I was going to before.

I realize this question is going to your expertise, and if you have any trouble with definitional terms, let's get them straight.

Mr. Halley. Right.

Mr. Wallach. Did JMWAVE itself as an entity have the capability to conduct an investigation to determine whether or

not there had been Cuban involvement in the assassination of President Kennedy in 1963?

Mr. Halley. I don't think there would have been a real world capability. I mean, if you're talking in my terms of conducting an investigation of this type in Cuba, which would have been professionally sound, that people could have put confidence in, I think the answer to that is probably no. I'm giving you an opinion. That is my opinion.

Mr. Wallach. Let's go back to terms, then. I'm not talking about an investigation where you could obviously have the freedom to go up and interview anyone you wanted to interview.

Mr. Halley. No. We are talking about through clandestine resources. In other words, to conduct this kind of investigation, you know, in my view, you would have had to have had a penetration of one or more of the Cuban intelligence services. The penetration would have had to have been in the 26th of July Movement, and had enough rapport with the top leadership that it could have moved freely in and out of a specific circle. It would probably had to have been at the level of a Comandante. We did not have that kind of resource in depth to conduct that kind of investigation.

Mr. Wallach. Were there ever any discussions at that time that you remember between yourself, Fitzgerald, Helms, anyone, as to whether or not the CIA did have the capability to conduct such an investigation?

Mr. Halley. I don't recall such a discussion, but again, the reason for it was, it was essentially felt at that time, as name traces were done, the whole mood and the whole atmosphere was that this was a case that was being investigated by the FBI. It was their jurisdictional problem.

Mr. Wallach. Did the FBI, to your knowledge, have the capacity to investigate or to conduct any sort of investigation inside Cuba?

Mr. Halley. Inside Cuba? No, I don't think they did.

Mr. Wallach. Did you have direct contact with anyone from the Bureau on a continuing basis from the FBI?

Mr. Johnston. Let's restructure that whole area.

What was the liaison relationship between JMWAVE, the Bureau and Florida?

Mr. Halley. There was a direct liaison on a daily working basis, if this was required, between JMWAVE and the Miami Field Office, I think it was called, as a separate field office.

Mr. Johnston. At what level was this liaison conducted, directly with you?

Mr. Halley. No. This was conducted at at least three levels that I can recall: periodically the Chief of the Field Office and I would meet to review problems, if we had any particular problems, or frankly, just to get together just to make sure that we did not have any problems. There was a

direct liaison on a working level between the people in the Counterintelligence shop of the Station and what I think the Bureau used to call the Tamale Squad, which were former Bureau agents who had been down in Havana, who had left when Fidel came into power, and were still working in Miami. And the third liaison was essentially with people who were working specific cases, where the name trace mechanism between ourselves and the Bureau would show some mutuality of interest in a particular case.

For instance, as an example, the Bureau might call up and say, look, what do you know about Juan Jose Gonzalez of the Second Front of the Escambrai. We'll say, okay, we'll take the question, we'll do a trace, prepare the answer, and somebody would go down and talk to them. So it was close. I would say it was close.

Mr. Johnston. Did you ever do the reverse? Did you ever ask the Bureau for information?

Mr. Halley. Yes. We traced specific people with the Bureau.

Mr. Johnston. In November, after the assassination of President Kennedy, did you personally meet with anybody from the FBI regarding the investigation?

Mr. Halley. I don't recall meeting on that specific subject.

Mr. Johnston. Do you know whether anyone in JMWAVE met

with the FBI in regard to the FBI investigation in Florida?

Mr. Halley. My recollection is that this name trace procedure was working, whatever they were working in relationsh to their investigation, was being run through us. In other words, how many traces, who was being traced, I couldn't answer that.

Mr. Johnston. Well, name traces are one thing. I guess I am talking one step above that. Did anyone in JMWAVE to your knowledge discuss with anyone in FBI in Florida the CIA's capability to assist the FBI investigation?

Mr. Halley. I have no way of answering that. I don't recall that. I don't recall that kind of thing. You know, this is -- you know, we're talking about 1963. This is 13 years ago, and I keep telling you, you know, I've had a busy, active life.

Senator Schweiker. You are doing so far very well.

Mr. Halley. I feel you are pressing me on something that is almost unreasonable. I mean, I don't recall each and every conversation. I mean, I had a 300 man station.

Mr. Johnston. I agree with you on that, but you are describing name traces, which you do seem to recall, but I'm saying was there anything beyond name traces that you recall. Was there any assistance given beyond name traces?

Senator Schweiker. Was there any higher level investi that you can recall?

Mr. Halley. The reason this name trace thing sticks in my mind, frankly, is because of the name traces that were conducted on Oswald when we got the hit, and I recall, the hit was made on the fact that there was the discussion and debate between Oswald and the DRE fellow, and we were tracing a lot of names at that time, and in conjunction with this particular event, once people were arrested and detained and there was some reason to expect that there was what I called an investigative follow-up, you know, you've got to start from some fact. What was the fact? You had a name, an address, a telephone number, that kind of tracing was going on. That is what impacts on me, what is this, you know, 13 years later.

Senator Schweiker. In connection with that, the group, the DRE group, there was some allegation that Oswald, I guess part of it is reality for sure, that he tried to penetrate the group himself by coming in when he was in New Orleans and infiltrate it on his own, which I guess is known,and what is in doubt, there was an allegation that while he was doing that, that he possibly talked of assassinating Kennedy or be paid money to assassinate Kennedy.

Does any of that conversation strike any bells or recollection with regard to DRE?

Mr. Halley. No, it doesn't, Senator, and I think I've got to explain this to you as to what was the nature of our relationship with the DRE. In other words, we had a

relationship with the DRE where we gave them a monthly subsidy. In other words, this would make them in our category like independent contractors. In return for this particular subsidy, they were to collect intelligence for us on the island of Cuba where they still had people. They were to be a symbol of a certain amount of resistance, therefore they had to engage in certain activities, propaganda, radio broadcasts, correspondence to their friends and associates on the inside to show that there was a spark on the outside, around which people could rally.

They also wanted to have a boat to move people inside and out of Cuba, and the money, the subsidy that we gave them helped them do all of these things. And we got an accounting from them. But we did not control each and every action that they took, so that if they chose, you know, not to report something to us, we wouldn't necessarily know it, and not every little detail of their organization did we know. If they met somebody --

Senator Schweiker. Well, I can understand that because there were a lot of groups like that, I'm sure.

Mr. Halley. But that particular one was one with which we had a subsidy relationship.

Senator Schweiker. Do you recall who your control relationship was with that particular group? I assume there was a CIA control relationship.

Mr. Halley. Yes, there was a particular man that was in liaison with that group, and there were several during that period of time.

Senator Schweiker. Might it have been Carlos Bringuier, the name we mentioned before?

Mr. Halley. You mentioned the name, and to be honest, the name doesn't ring a bell. But is he also known as Fatty?

Senator Schweiker. Well, you've got me now.

Mr. Halley. Well, every Cuban has an alias, like, they call him El Gordo or something like that.

Senator Schweiker. Well, it might be. He fits it.

Mr. Halley. Well, you might be able to answer this. Was he the fellow that was on the DRE boat that raided Havana? I have trouble matching up some of these names, and frankly, that name doesn't ring a bell, but I might have known him as El Gordo, and he was on the boat, and we dealt with different people.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Johnston. Let me show you WAVE cable 8049, dated 23 November '63, which is your report on this DRE matter, and that cable basically indicates that you got information from DRE about Oswald.

Is that correct?

Mr. Halley. Yes. The wording of this particular cable shows that we did get from the DRE files this information.

Mr. Johnston. My question to you is, of partial significance, and that is the fact that that cable says that Oswald "allegedly lives in home of Foreign Minister for two months."

My question is that this allegation that he lived in the home of the Soviet foreign minister has never been substantiated through any other source, and I wonder whether you have a recollection of going back to DRE to see where they got that information.

Mr. Halley. No, I don't have a recollection of going back on that specific cable.

Mr. Johnston. Do you have any recollection of headquarters ever coming back to you and saying what is the source of that?

Mr. Halley. Xyou know, I don't see how you can expect me to remember that, really. You know, in the course of a day, a normal day, I might read a thousand cables.

Senator Schweiker. Well, does the fact that he might have lived in a Soviet foreign minister's home for two months ring a bell?

Mr. Halley. Well, you know, showing me that cable, I have to accept the cable at face value. That is what it says. I acknowledge that is what it says. The cable says we got it from the DRE. I accept it on face value. That incident, the foreign minister's residence, does not ring a bell with me.

Senator Schweiker. So you wouldn't know offhand where that allegation came from.

Mr. Halley. No, I don't know. We would have to go back to them and their criteria for carding might not coincide with ours. In other words, many of these Cuban groups were prone to act on rumors. They were prone to publicize things that were not true. The DRE had a record of publicizing, embroidering, elaborating on things, and therefore we treated a lot of their material with caution.

Senator Schweiker. Right.

Go ahead, Paul.

Mr. Wallach. Generally, now, and I'm not asking for specific conversations at all. I think it is entirely true, it is a caveat throughout this entire thing, we are talking about 13 years ago, millions of matters ago. But generally, do you recall whether or not the FBI, the people you dealt with had any general knowledge of the CIA's capability inside Cuba to get information?

Mr. Halley. Well, I think it would be fair to say that the FBI knew the kinds of operations that we were running, and I think they could have drawn certain conclusions about, you know, what our capability might have been. That is, let me put this in perspective. I'm talking about the people in Miami. Occasionally when I would come to Washington for conferences, I would meet somebody like Papich. We happened to be, you know, friends, and I would talk to him and say how are you doing, how are things going, what kind of activit

are you involved in?

Papich probably have a feel for the scope of our activity, but whether he would have an appreciation of the kinds of specific sources, I doubt it.

Mr. Wallach. In other words, you would doubt whether or not anyone in the Bureau would have known whether or not you had an extremely high level source in Castro's entourage.

Mr. Halley. I doubt that they would know that.

Mr. Wallach. At any time, do you recall after the assassination anyone from the Bureau, even from the Miami field office or from headquarters, through Papich, through your headquarters contacting you to determine whether or not you had the capability to conduct investigations on Cuba?

Mr. Halley. No, I don't recall that.

Do you want me -- can we go off the record for a minute?

Senator Schweiker. Yes.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Wallach. Let's go back on the record.

Were you known to the FBI under your real name or under an alias?

Mr. Halley. No, I was known to the FBI under my true name. If you are wondering about whether the name is going to show up in the FBI records, I think they always would, in the writing of reports, do not use the true names. In other words they say, you know, source or confidential informant, or A-

whatever it was called, and that is the way they write their reports.

Mr. Wallach. Let me ask you this. I realize this was a subject matter that was covered in your previous testimony. I deem it of relevance, and I would like to ask you here, were you aware on November 22nd, 1963, that the CIA had at some point in time prior to that date itself engaged in attempts to assassinate or used others in attempts to assassinate Fidel Castro?

Mr. Halley. No. I think the basic answer to that question is no, but if you looked at my previous testimony, I previously said that in the case of this Cuban comandante over the years, I had acquired some knowledge of the fact that he existed and he was being run by my colleagues in Washington, but that case was not known to me as a clearcut assassination operation. In other words, at one point in time I knew that Des Fitzgerald was going to meet this fellow. I knew at one point in time there was going to be a meeting in Spain. I knew at one point in time that we were putting caches in to support this particular fellow. I never knew whether the caches were recovered, and things like that. But the fundamental answer is no.

I have also previously testified that on some of the activities that were being engaged in by Mr. Harvey, that I was not knowledgeable on, you know, the thrust of those activities.

Mr. Wallach. Did your own sources in the Cuban communit-

tell you that the, what we call the underworld, the Mafia, was engaging in attempts to assassinate Fidel Castro?

Mr. Halley. I don't recall any such reports, but I've explained this, and let me go again on this, that assassination, the word "assassination" was part of the ambience of that time. In other words, every Cuban that you talked to, nobody could be involved in Cuban operations without having had some sort of a discussion at some time with some Cuban who said, gee, we ought to knock this guy off, or I'd shoot him if I had the chance, or the way to create a revolution is to shoot Fidel and Raul, and then go down through the whole proposition. So the fact that somebody would talk about assassination just wasn't anything that was really out of the ordinary at the time. It was part of the climate. These were professional revolutionaries in some cases, men who had been in the 26th of July movement and left, and come in and become exiles, and had been exiles two or three times. Revolution and assassination was a way of life for them.

Mr. Wallach. Did you have any doubt in your mind that Castro was aware in November 1963 that the CIA was supporting these revolutionaries?

Mr. Halley. Supporting revolutionaries.

Mr. Wallach. Right.

Mr. Halley. Yes, I think Castro knew that the United States was in touch with groups like the DRE, that people

were being infiltrated by CIA into Cuba, because they apprehended some of them.

Mr. Wallach. Groups that were trying to overthrow Castro.

Mr. Halley. But he had to assume that if they were coming in, they were setting up guerilla forces in places like Oriente Province, and Pinar del Rio, that yes, they were going to work to overthrow him, and he had to know that.

Mr. Wallach. Were you aware of any other country that the United States Government was at that time attempting to overthrow the government of, and we can get your answer off the record if it is positive.

Mr. Halley. Well, wait a minute. Would you rephrase that? I'm not sure I follow that particular one.

Mr. Wallach. You came back to me with the word assassination, said it was part of the ambience of the times, that that might have been discussed at one time or another. My belief, as a layman, has been I don't see that much of a distinction between sending someone in who is going to try to foment a revolution, the result of which would probably be the death of Castro as opposed to sending someone in to -- I don't want to get into this, but I think that may have been something that you were touching on.

In any event, are you aware of any other country that the U.S. at that time was directing attempts to overthrow the

government of?

Mr. Halley. No. Off the top of my head, no, but I do want to come back to your point. I do think there is a difference in the Latin American revolutionary sense of plotting a revolution against somebody as opposed to plotting a specific assassination operation against a particular individual. You know, maybe we have an honest difference of opinion on that point, but my view differs from yours.

Mr. Wallach. All right, let me continue on.

You also mentioned before that some of the people, the people that you felt were making general policy, were Helms, Bobby Kennedy, at one point Ed Lansdale.

Mr. Halley. Uh-huh.

Mr. Wallach. Did the Cubans know that? Did the Cubans know that Bobby Kennedy was involved?

Mr. Halley. I don't know that they were at that point in time, but clearly at later points of time when the Brigade 2506 returned, yes, they knew that Bobby Kennedy was in the Cuban policy affairs. Leaders of the Brigade like Artime, Oliva, the San Juan brothers and others were brought to Washington for lunches, dinners with, I guess at that time it was the Attorney General, because there were various phases in this thing.

Yes, they knew he was involved in Cuban affairs.

Mr. Wallach. Are you familiar with an article that appe-

in I think it was the September 7th issue of the New Orleans Times-Picayune, among other newspapers, which reflected an interview Castro had with Daniel Harker of the AP, within which he said in substance that U.S. leaders would be in danger if they continued in their attempts, I think he used the word "eliminate".

Mr. Halley. Yes, I'm familiar with the general article, yes, but I can't tell you with certainty that I was aware of that article at the time that it appeared. In other words, you're asking about 1961, did you say it appeared?

Mr. Wallach. September 7, 1963.

Mr. Halley. I cannot swear that I knew about it in 1963. I since know that that article has been referred to a number of times.

Mr. Johnston. Let me just state for the record that I did not bring the WAVE cable on it, but WAVE did pass to headquarters the gist of that article as it appeared in Miami articles, passed that information to headquarters either on the 23rd or 24th of 3ovember because the FBI was inquiring about exile groups claiming that Castro had threatened Kenne[illegible] anyway, so that at least WAVE had knowledge right after the assassination of that article.

Mr. Halley. All right. The reason I qualify my respons[illegible] that may have been a cable that would have been released by some member of my staff. It didn't necessarily follow that [illegible]

was a WAVE cable, that I personally released it. I don't happen to recall it, but I am familiar with the article and the thrust of it.

Mr. Wallach. I realize again you may not have been familiar with it at that time, or even before the assassination, but what -- and I'm not asking specifically for what facts, but you have testified previously that -- I don't want to paraphrase your testimony, it speaks for itself -- that you had no reason to believe that the Cubans were involved in the assassination of President Kennedy.

Mr. Halley. Yes, at the time that the incident occurred, and when Oswald was apprehended, I had no reason to believe that the Cubans were involved.

Mr. Wallach. Taking the other side of the coin, what evidence was there in your mind that they were not involved?

Mr. Halley. Well, because we didn't have any evidence that they were.

Mr. Wallach. Did you conduct any investigation at all to determine if there was any involvement?

Mr. Halley. I didn't have any charter for that. I mean, people were arrested. The FBI and the authorities in that particular, in Dallas, were pursuing the case. I had no charter to pursue that.

Mr. Wallach. Did you ever ask Mr. Helms whether or not you could conduct such an investigation, or did he ever tell

you that you could or could not?

Mr. Halley. No, I answered that, that I don't recall any such conversation where Helms told me I could or could not. I mean, this was not a subject that was being discussed.

I think the frame of reference at the time was that this was not a jurisdictional case for the CIA to pursue.

Mr. Wallach. You mean, the President of the United States is murdered, and it is not within the jurisdiction of the CIA to determine if a foreign country is involved?

Mr. Halley. Not if the investigation is run by the FBI and a person is apprehended, and one is going to assume that he is going to be interrogated, investigative leads are going to be obtained from it, and a particular agency has got the action responsibility. Under those circumstances, my perception of the various rules is that CIA performs a support function. In other words, if you are asked for a name trace, or traces on telephone numbers, physical descriptions, you know, license plates, whatever it may be, you respond.

Mr. Wallach. Who gave you these instructions, that CIA was only going to have a support function?

Mr. Halley. That is my perception.

Mr. Wallach. Who told you that?

Mr. Halley. Nobody has to tell you that. You're an intelligence human being. You're allowed to think for yourself and you can come to logical conclusions.

Mr. Wallach. Did somebody tell youthat the FBI had primary jurisdiction?

Mr. Halley. No, but the FBI has primary jurisdiction, this is something we are taught in our training courses, in the United States, you know, for cases in the United States. For instance, my explanation of this -- I gave you an explanation of the counterintelligence case in the States where we found a Cuban agent in the United States,and the jurisdiction of the case reverted to the FBI.

Senator Schweiker. Do you want to make a comment here, Seymour?

Mr. Bolten. I'd like to go off the record.

Senator Schweiker. All right.

(Discussion off the record.)

Senator Schweiker. Let's go back on the record.

Mr. Wallach. I have one or two more questions on this.

Senator Schweiker. All right.

Mr. Wallach. Did at any time during the existence of the Warren Commission, do you recall -- and I'm not asking for a specific event, but do you recall having any type of indirect relationship with that Commission, in essence, responding to requests that were made of the Agency and they asking you for general information?

Mr. Halley. Would you give me the dates of the Warren Commission?

Mr. Wallach. December 1, '63 --

Mr. Halley. December 1, '63 to when?

Mr. Wallach. September of '64.

Mr. Halley. No. No.

Mr. Wallach. Do you have any reason today to believe that there was Cuban involvement in the assassination of President Kennedy?

Mr. Halley. I have no hard information on that.

Mr. Wallach. Do you have any hearsay information?

Mr. Halley. No. I mean, hearsay information, what constitutes hearsay? Criel wrote an article in the Washington Post, you know, suggesting that there is some -- is that hearsay evidence? I mean, I don't happen to believe his thesis.

Mr. Wallach. I am asking you if you have any belief as an expert?

Mr. Halley. As an expert I only deal in facts, in other words not -- what I consider hard intelligence, I don't have any hard intelligence.

Mr. Johnston. Other than the FBI, did you have a liaison with other investigative agencies?

Mr. Halley. Yes, I did.

Mr. Johnston. Did you have an investigative relationship with the U.S. Customs Department, specifically a Customs agent who was on detail to CIA?

Mr. Halley. Yes, we had a relationship with a Customs

agent by the name of Caesar DeEstado. Caesar DeEstado was detailed on an arrangement between CIA which was in being when I came to the station. His primary function was to be stationed in Key West, Florida. He generally covered the area from Key West to either Marathon or it could have been -- either Marathon or El Marado, and his tasks were, one, to find Cubans who were coming into the United States in small boats, and to ensure that he took a quick look at them to see if any one of them could be turned around to be used as intelligence sources. If they couldn't be used as intelligence sources, he skimmed off the perishable information that was really critical, and then put it into our system. He also flagged the knowledgeable people for further exploitation by us when the went to the Opa Laca briefing center. He also picked up equipment, that is documents from these people, weapons, clothing, so that we could use authentic clothing to equip our own teams.

Mr. Johnston. Did he also stay in contact with certain Cuban exiles?

Mr. Halley. He did stay in contact with Cuban exile groups because it was part of his job to know when they were going out so that we didn't have these uncoordinated problems. In other words, at one point we tried to stop them. He also has to know who was in the area running a training camp or something like that, so that our operations would not be

compromised by coming into a camp next to where some exiled Cubans were already working.

Mr. Johnston. And did he -- let me back up. First, have you participated in the Agency's response to the Committee's written inquiry about this?

Mr. Halley. Well, to this extent, somebody in the Agency called me and said the Committee had a request in for some data on a Customs officer. Nobody could remember his name. I happened to remember his name. I said Caesar DeEstado was the guy's name. I don't remember how to spell it. Phonetically I think it is as follows, and try to find a file on it. And so to that extent, yes, I am aware that there was some sort of a response being prepared. I did not see the response. I don't know what it says.

Mr. Johnston. Do you know whether he was asked either by you or by anybody in WAVE to contact Cuban exiles after the assassination to see what knowledge they might have?

Mr. Halley. Well, let me try to clarify that. I was not his contact point. In other words, I was a manager of a large operation.

Mr. Johnston. I understand that. So did anybody under your control contact him?

Mr. Halley. His point of contact was in Key West. Periodically he would either come to Miami or meet with one of our people, and once every three months or something like that I

would have a meeting with him to review broad trends, either in Key West or in Miami. I never taked him with this type of thing. I don't recall anybody else in the station tasking him to conduct an investigation of Cuban groups relative to the President's assassination. But as we were putting together mood cables -- you showed me an example of one there -- it is conceivable that he is the kind of person that we would have talked to to find out what was going on in the Cuban community at that time.

Mr. Johnston. Do you know whether he did in fact contact Cuban exiles about it? Do you have any knowledge of his contacts with Cuban exiles?

Mr. Halley. I don't have any firsthand knowledge.

Mr. Johnston. Do you have any knowledge whatsoever?

Mr. Halley. I would have to say firsthand, I don't recall any information of any subordinate of mine reporting to me that he had done that.

Mr. Johnston. You testified earlier that you met with Mr. Fitzgerald at some point, and that he told you at that time that he made contact personally with a Cuban agent, one named AMLASH?

Mr. Halley. I think my testimony was something along that line, that I had a conversation with Fitzgerald, that he was going to meet a Cuban source. My recollection was that the name may have come up, that he was asking my opinion and adv...

as to whether this would be a useful thing to do. And as I have testified before, my recollection is I told him I thought I would find this conversation interesting, but I didn't think it was worth his doing because he had too high a profile, and it would not be a good thing to do from the point of view of attribution in relationship to a clandestine agent.

Mr. Johnston. And let me go through what you have just told me.

First of all, was this agent, when he used the true name, was it the agent whose cryptonym is AMLASH?

Mr. Halley. Yes. Subsequently I have concluded that that is who it is.

Mr. Johnston. Did he tell you or indicate that a meeting between him and AMLASH was proposed?

Mr. Halley. Well, he was considering a meeting with AMLASH, with this particular person.

Mr. Johnston. Do you have a recollection as to what timeframe your discussion with Mr. Fitzgerald was?

Mr. Halley. No, I don't.

Mr. Johnston. Knowing that Mr. Fitzgerald met with AMLASH on October 29th, 1963, does that refresh your recollection as to whether the conversation took place earlier in 1963?

Mr. Halley. I am sorry, I can't narrow that down for you.

Mr. Johnston. But you advised against the meeting.

Mr. Halley. Right.

Mr. Johnston. You were knowledgeable, I take it, of the Agency's dealing with AMLASH from time to time, as part of JMWAVE.

Mr. Halley. Yes. I mentioned to you earlier that we had put in caches which were scheduled to be retrieved by AMLASH or his people, so yes, I knew that we were providing support to an agent in Cuba, but that was not unusual because we were putting in a large number of caches for a wide variety of people who were being run out of Washington, over and out of other stations.

Mr. Johnston. And you may have testified about this before, but was it common to drop caches of rifles or telescopic sights for agents?

Mr. Halley. I would not necessarily have known what was in each cache.

Mr. Johnston. Well, was it common to drop, to your knowledge, to drop rifles with telescopic sights?

Mr. Halley. Well, I think the thing that would be uncommon would be telescopic sights. Many of our caches were weapons caches. A large bulk of the caches were rifles of one kind or another. We put in the FAL, the Belgian FAL, we put in M-1s. We put in carbines, we put in Springfields, we put in Thompson submachine guns. I think if I were looking at a cache list and I saw a telescope on it matched up with a

Springfield '03 rifle, that probably would have struck me as being unusual, but I did not see the inventories of all the caches.

Mr. Johnston. Would you commonly or routinely see cables from the Director, especially on the AMLASH operation?

Mr. Halley. No.

From the Director to whom?

Mr. Johnston. To JMWAVE.

Mr. Halley. My recollection is, other than specific requests to put in caches, that there wasn't any cable traffic between Washington and JMWAVE on that particular operation.

Mr. Johnston. I am searching through my notes --

Mr. Halley. Right.

Mr. Johnston. The Committee does not have copies of the file of AMLASH. That is at the Agency. Let me, if you'll accept it as a fact that there was a cable in early December 1963 from the Director to JMWAVE directing, using the crypt AMLASH and directing that a cache be supplied him, including in that, itemizing two rifles with telescopic sights.

Mr. Halley. That kind of a cable I may or may not have seen. In other words, that would have been a fairly standard logistics kind of thing to get a cache and it would have come up on my briefing chart for the month, the operation, X number of days before the operation was launched, I would have had a briefing with all of the paramilitary and maritime officers

and our COMINT, ELINT and other specialists to look at the OV and make a decision as to whether the operation should go or not go. At that point I probably would have known that it was a cache, that it contained weapons, that it was in support of a headquarters run operation.

Mr. Johnston. Do you recall on or about 7 or 8 December 1963 a stop being put on operations, certain operations that went into Cuba?

Mr. Halley. I don't recall that specific timeframe, but there were periodic ups and downs in the number of operations that could be run. We would get policy guidance to stand down for a period of time; that once one of those things came out, I think that we had a series of discussions, I think, with Washington, and appeals, that if there was a standdown, and we had to say something, who were dependent on us in Cuba for food and a continuing flow of weapons, that we couldn't have them preparing these caches and risking their lives to come to the reception points and not be able to meet the schedules.

Mr. Johnston. Do you recall, though, in the period 6, 7 and 8 December, headquarters first authorizing certain operations and then calling off the operations, and specifical cables which said, and I quote -- pardon me, I don't quote, the operations being called off, "pending major top level Cuban-Caribbean policy review scheduled early next week which

should provide basis for decision."

Mr. Halley. I don't recall your specific dates or your timeframe, but the point I would like to leave with you is that there were several periods like that where we had upsand downs, and yes, I do recall standdowns on operations.

Mr. Johnston. You don't recall a standdown within two weeks of the assassination of President Kennedy.

Mr. Halley. I am sorry, I don't. You know, I accept that it occurred, but you know, there were so many of those during the three and a half year period of time that I don't recall that specific one.

Mr. Johnston. What does the phrase "higher authority" generally mean in Agency cables?

Mr. Halley. Well, at that particular point in time, I think higher authority was a euphemism for the President and top level policy decisionmakers at the NSC 40 Committee level.

Mr. Johnston. And again, you don't recall knowing in the same time period, December 1963, that you were cabled that the headquarters procedure was to present the infiltration procedures to higher authority.

Mr. Halley. Well, I have forgotten the date when this transition took place. As of a fixed date, in the course of this operation, we had to supply all of our infiltration operations a month in advance. I'm sorry, I just don't recall when that went into effect. Prior to that time we were

pretty well scheduling these ourselves, but then a request came in that we put these in a month in advance. So as I told you before, if I wanted to run a schedule for October, I had to have it in in Washington with all of the Ops plans by I think the 15th of September.

Senator Schweiker. Did a former ambassador William Pauley, a man called William Pauley, who at one time owned properties in Havana and now living in Miami, did he ever finance some of the operations that you are aware of out of Miami, William Pauley?

Mr. Halley. Yes, I know Bill Pauley. He was involved in, in my time, in one specific operational activity. I don't think it would be proper to say that he financed it, however.

Senator Schweiker. This is the one where people were killed in a boat raid?

Mr. Halley. Well, we don't know what happened to them. My recollection of the operation is that Bill Pauley was approached by Life Magazine, and this was involved with an individual by the name of John Martino, because this has come up recently. The Committee has asked me about this before I told them at first I couldn't remember the name, and I had to go back and conduct a file search, and I came up with John Martino's name, who had been involved in gambling casinos in Cuba.

Martino was in touch with a number of Cubans who

claimed that they had access to two Soviet missile technicians. Pauley brought this operation to the Agency, and the Agency agreed that we would cooperate with them in pursuit of this operation.

Senator Schweiker. And Time-Life did some funding for it, too?

Mr. Halley. Well, they were involved, but they did not fund it. My recollection is Pauley made the boat available, the Flying Tiger, which was his yacht, we paid for the gas and oil for that particular boat, and we provided all of the other equipment that went into the operation. Pauley went on that vessel down to the launch point. The men were launched in a small infiltration boat. It took off, went off toward the Cuban mainland, and were never seen or heard from since then. We never had any reporting on them.

Senator Schweiker. Was Pauley involved with other operations with you folks, or is that the only one?

Mr. Halley. That is the only operation that he was involved with the Agency. He, however, was very helpful in terms of providing advice on various people that he had known from his long involvement in Cuba. He was useful in providing introductions to various people that we wanted to meet. I recall on one occasion he introduced me to a prominent Cuban that I wanted to meet. He brokered that.

Pauley, on his own, gave money to various Cuban groups.

unrelated to what we were doing. He was also a participant in the raising of the initial ransom for the members of Brigade 2506.

Senator Schweiker. Here is an article -- rather than me read it, I'll give you a chance to read it. It is Claire Booth Luce. As you know, she is on the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, and has been for some time, and Bill Colby was her chief of station when she was ambassador to Italy. This story came to me not through the paper, frankly, but from Mrs. Luce personally, expressing her concern. It subsequently did appear in a paper and I did not release it. Mrs. Luce specifically released it to Betty Beale, and the reason it is relevant here is that from what I read here, the group she is referring to is probably the DRE group or some part of the DRE group in New Orleans, and while that is not too clear, she did associate Mr. William Pauley with it. But that is somewhat confused, because you said he wasn't involved in any other operation other than the one you mentioned.

Mr. Halley. Well, I'm -- Mr. Pauley, I know Mr. Pauley and Mrs. Luce are friends. They see each other, or they used to. I haven't seen them in a number of years, but they used to be in the same social circuit, so I am sure that Mr. Pauley recounted a war story in his contacts, so she is probably aware of the general operation to get the two Soviets out of Cuba. That is the only operation that he ran with us during

my stewardship of the station.

Senator Schweiker. There is a vast difference of recollection between the two on what happened. She very strongly recollects that in addition to the thing that you described, which is a matter of record, by the way, with the Senate Committee, it is a matter of Committee record, in addition to that, that this is in it also.

Rather than read the whole thing, you might read the paragraphs I have outlined. She feels very strongly about it. She has called me several times about it. She is absolutely certain of her information, and her Cuban source doesn't want to talk for fear of his life.

(The Witness reads the document.)

Mr. Halley. No, that doesn't ring any bells. I cannot put that in any context.

Let me go back to this Pauley business. I think at one time, one other thing that Pauley did for us, I think he provided an opportunity for us to pick up some cargo in the Dominican Republic to provide cover for one of our vessels that we were using at that time for infiltration operations in the area but those are the only things that I can remember off the top of my head.

Senator Schweiker. You see, where he says here that he made contact with a group, the story goes on to say that this group supplied a tape and pictures of that contact, and that the

FBI did not follow them up, which is a rather serious charge itself, and that is why I wonder if there is some DRE relationship here with Bringuier.

Maybe you can give us that case officer's name, Seymour.

Mr. Bolten. Which one?

Senator Schweiker. The case officer for the DRE group.

It would have to be the one at the time when Oswald was in New Orleans, which is -- when was that?

Mr. Johnston. The fall of '63.

(Discussion off the record.)

Senator Schweiker. Going on, I didn't follow the final question on DeEstada, your detail man to Customs.

Were you aware that he was doing some investigating after the Kennedy assassination?

Mr. Halley. No, I don't have any firsthand recollection of that.

Senator Schweiker. And the way you were structured, woul[d] he be the logical person to, if somebody asked for either a name check or some follow-up --

Mr. Halley. He would have been the logical person if we had something specific to pursue or he would have been the logical person to put a question to if we were looking for atmospheric, you know, what the Cuban community was thinkin[g].

Senator Schweiker. How about Julio Lobo?

Mr. Halley. He's the sugar king.

Senator Schweiker. He's the sugar king there.

Did he assist with any of your operations, either financially or in terms of his people or in terms of his organization?

Mr. Halley. My recollection of that, there was no direct contact between us and Julio Lobo. We did have various Cuban investigative and research groups that we were working with. My belief is that one of these groups must have been tapping Lobo for his knowledge of the sugar market, because we were constantly making projections of where the sugar crop was going in Cuba, because that impacted on the stability of the Cuban economy. In other words, when it was a good crop, you could figure that Castro's going to have X millions of dollars. When he didn't have a good crop, this was going to impact on where he wanted to go with building the revolution.

Senator Schweiker. There is another name that I believe had some relationship with him, maybe businesswise, James Coyswell, or Caldwell.

Mr. Halley. Caldwell. I think that was the fellow that was employed by the Agency at one time.

Senator Schweiker. Right.

Mr. Halley. Who was --

Senator Schweiker. What was his project at that point?

Mr. Halley. He was working here in Washington. He was on the Cuban project in Washington. He was primarily concerned with economic activities and how pressure could be put on th

Cuban economy.

Senator Schweiker. And how about an Antonio Veciana, a Cuban name?

Mr. Halley. Yeah, I think he's the owner, one of the part owners in the restaurant in Miami called Las Violinas.

Senator Schweiker. At one point he worked for --

Mr. Halley. Could you spell the name?

Senator Schweiker. Maybe I'm not pronouncing it right. V-e-c-i-a-n-a.

Mr. Halley. I think that's the fellow who used to run the restaurant called Las Violinas, and he was involved with a number of Cuban exile groups. I think he was connected with the second front of the Escambray, but that is off the top of my head. We'd have to do a trace.

Senator Schweiker. Did David Phillips, during your tenure there, have any assignment in Cuba?

What was his relationship at the time of this period? David Phillips? That's head of the Retired --

Mr. Halley. Yes, at that point in time he was stationed in Mexico City, and my recollection was that he was involved in covert operation actions against Cuba out of Mexico City, and he may have been involved in operations against the Cuban embassy in Mexico City. I am a little vaguer on that than I am on the first part.

I know we had some travelers going down to Mexico City

and their point of contact frequently was Dave Phillips, but most of those fellows were dealing with propaganda distribution, but he could well also have worked against the installation.

At that time he was not the station chief. He was a secondary figure, I guess, at the station.

Senator Schweiker. Did Howard Hughes or his organization or Intertel, assist you in any operations, and I am going to exclude for the moment Mr. Maheu, who we know had a very specific role, excluding the Maheu situation with Giancana and Rosselli that I think you are familiar wity --

Mr. Halley. Yes.

Senator Schweiker. To your knowledge, did Howard Hughes, Intertel or any of his other groups or associations assist or work with you in the Cuban operation?

Mr. Halley. Not with the Miami station that I am aware of.

Senator Schweiker. Well, I'm not talking about --

Mr. Halley. Well, back here in Washington that could be, but I have no knowledge of it. I can only answer it out of the Miami context.

Senator Schweiker. At one point in time, probably when you first came aboard, there was a Lt. Colonel Samuel Kail, who was military attache to the Havana embassy.

Does that name ring a bell?

Mr. Halley. Yes, it does.

Senator Schweiker. What role was he playing when you came aboard?

Mr. Halley. He either came about the same time that I did or shortly after I arrived in Miami, and he was in fact the number two fellow at the Opa Locka debriefing center. We [illegible] inter-agency debriefing center set up at Opa Locka. The head of the center was a CIA officer. His principal deputy was Kale. He was the general administrator of the program and he supervised the military personnel who were on detail to the center, and there were debriefing people there for positive intelligence, and when they found someone who was particular knowledgeable or had some operational exploitation, they was flag them to us.

Senator Schweiker. Was he ever detailed to CIA or was he strictly Army intelligence?

Mr. Halley. No, at that time he was an Army officer working on a joint project that wasn't a detail assignment. was just assigned to Opa Locka.

Senator Schweiker. Purely Army, but working with you cooperatively.

Mr. Halley. Well, I think what happened, unlike what would go on overseas, a table of organization was drawn up for the Opa Locka center, and it was agreed that the head of this center would be CIA, so we assigned that man to that. It was agreed that the deputy of the center would be a [illegible]

officer. Therefore Kale was assigned to that. He continued to receive his pay, quarters, and other allowance through the military establishment.

Senator Schweiker. What about when he was at the Havana embassy?

You are talking about, I guess, after he left the Havana embassy.

Mr. Halley. Yes. I am talking about the period 1962 forward, and as I recall, he must have been there up to the end of my tenure there. I have forgotten when he left. I have no knowledge of his activities in Havana. That was before my time. I simply know that he served in Havana, that he was a social acquaintance of a number of the officers that I had in the station, but I had no firsthand knowledge.

Senator Schweiker. How about Robert Brown or Colonel Nichols, the same question, Robert Brown?

Mr. Halley. Senator, you'll have to give me something more than Robert Brown. That doesn't give me anything. I'm sorry. The other was what, Colonel Nichols?

Senator Schweiker. Colonel Nichols. He was also at the Havana embassy at some point in time.

Mr. Halley. I would have no knowledge of him.

Senator Schweiker. Now, there was a group called Celula Fantasma. Are you familiar with that group?

Mr. Halley. I have heard the name.

Senator Schweiker. And it was a project where two American pilots were killed. The group conducted some para-military operation.

Mr. Halley. That doesn't ring a bell, but the Celula Fantasma is a name that I've heard. I can't put it into any broader context for you. It certainly was not one of our operations.

Senator Schweiker. That was really my question.

Do you recall -- was there anyone using the name or cryptoname of Bishop for you at any point in time in terms of the Cuban operations, either Morris Bishop or some other Bishop?

Mr. Halley. That name doesn't mean anything to me.

Senator Schweiker. Here is a sketch of a person. Does this sketch look like anyone that might have been associated . cuban operations, either pro-Castro or anti-Castro?

(The Witness looks at a sketch.)

Mr. Halley. No, it doesn't. I mean, there is somethi... about the face that is familiar, but I can't put a name to it and it doesn't ring any bells with me in relationship to ... Cuban operation.

Senator Schweiker. We'll ask Seymour.

Seymour, how about you, any recollection?

Mr. Bolten. Is it supposed to be Cuban or an American?

Senator Schweiker. I think an American, but I'm not c...

on that, someone who did do some work in the Cuban activities, supposedly on the anti-Castro side.

Mr. Bolten. He has very regular features, so he could be almost anybody, you know.

And like John says, it is a sort of -- he could be familiar. No, I wouldn't place him with anyone I know.

Senator Schweiker. Go ahead.

Mr. Johnston. Do you recall Director McCone visiting the station in early December or mid-December of 1963?

Mr. Halley. Mr. McCone made a couple of visits to Florida. I'm not sure it would be fair to say that he visited the station. My recollection of that is he came to Florida. He was put in the property that we had, we had conversations with him out at that property, but he didn't come out to the physical plant, that is, our station premise, and in most cases he was usually en route to or coming back from somewhere.

Mr. Johnston. Do you recall such a visit in December of 1963?

Mr. Halley. I can't pin it down to that timeframe. In other words, my memory is McCone came to Miami several times.

Mr. Johnston. Well, let's put it in the timeframe of a short period after the assassination of President Kennedy.

Mr. Halley. I cannot put it into the timeframe, I just can't. All I can tell you is McCone came down to Florida on

a number of occasions. You know, if you asked me what your impression, I don't know, maybe three, four.

Mr. Johnston. Do you recall anyone from headquarters coming down to visit with you in December 1963? Again, this is shortly after the assassination of President Kennedy.

Mr. Halley. Do you have the chronology? Was Harvey still --

Mr. Johnston. No, it was Fitzgerald.

Mr. Halley. Okay. No, I don't, because Harvey periodically when he was in used to come down at the time of the Orange Bowl game. I do remember going to an Orange Bowl game with Harvey. So I would have to say no, I don't.

But look again --

Mr. Johnston. Well, let me just back up.

Do you know -- did you have any discussions with anyone from the headquarters staff about the effect of the assassination of President Kennedy on Cuban operations?

Mr. Halley. Well, it seems to me logical that there may have been some sort of discussion at that time, but I don't recall it. You know, you have to put this in this kind of a context. It was a steady stream of people coming from Washington to Miami. I came to Washington on a regular basis. There would be times when I would come up once every two weeks. There would be times when I wouldn't be up here for six weeks, and this was a very active period. I was working 14, 15, 16 hours

a day, seven days a week, and a lot of this is a blur to me.

So when you say do you remember McCone coming, yes, I do remember that. Can you put it in a time frame of 7 to 8 December, no, I can't.

Mr. Johnston. Can you put it in the timeframe of shortly after the assassination of the President?

Mr. Halley. I can. You know, you asked me, did anybody come down to visit you in the December timeframe. That's why I asked you about who was the chief because I do recall going to an Orange Bowl game with Harvey one year. Des came down, Fitzgerald came down a couple of times, but I don't remember him ever coming in the Christmas timeframe, you know?

Mr. Johnston. Do you recall having discussions with -- and I take it your answer is yes -- do you recall discussion[illegible] between you and someone from headquarters about the effect [illegible] President Kennedy's assassination on the Cuban operation?

Mr. Halley. I am sure that there were such discussion[illegible], you know, where is the program going to go, how are we go[illegible] to be tasked.

But if you ask me, what date, where, Washington or Miami, I couldn't sharpen it up for you.

Mr. Johnston. Do you recall such a discussion with Director McCone?

Mr. Halley. No, I don't.

Mr. Johnston. Do you recall such a discussion with Mr. Helms?

Mr. Halley. No, I have to come back to the basic point. I don't recall this kind of specific conversation with a particular individual, but I am sure that these kinds of conversations must have taken place with somebody from Washington or when I was up here in Washington.

Mr. Johnston. Let me show you the cable that you looked at previously before we went on the record, which is WAVE cable 8130 of 24 November 1963, and the copy we have is barely legible. The gist of that in the last numbered paragraph reports information WAVE obtained on an individual named Rodriguez in Dallas, and also, I think, reports, if you can read through the poor Xeroxing, that Rodriguez was thought to be anti-Kennedy.

My question being, where would you have gotten that kind of information?

(The Witness reads the document.)

Mr. Halley. Well, to be honest with you, I can't read the message. It says read Para 2, [illegible]. We'd have to go up and look up who the man is. This is one of literally thousands of cryptonyms across my desk.

It looks to me like [illegible].

Mr. Johnston. Let's go off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Halley. WAVE traces, now, that indicates to me that whatever was done here was based on the material that was passively in the files.

Where did material that was in our files. We got material that was in these files from agent reporting, we got it from refugee debriefings, we got it from our, you know, from sources in the Cuban community who were reporting on Cuban groups. We got it on a monitoring of the Cuban press, and the Spanish press in Miami, we got it from monitoring radio broadcasts and so forth. So that it was this kind of a conglomerate of information.

Now, let's take a name, you know, like Rodriguez. A name like Rodriguez in the card file, there might be two inches of Rodriguezes. You know, if you were looking for a specific Rodriguez, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, you know, somethin like that, then you'd have to pin it down, in other words, age, what his membership was in he party and things like that. So that indicates to me that we found this material in the file.

Who the source is, I don't know. We'd have to look up the crypt and find the true name, and maybe even then I couldn't tell you.

Mr. Johnston. But that source is liable to be a Cuban exile in Miami, is that correct?

Mr. Halley. Well, not being able to read the thing,

don't even want to speculate on it.

Mr. Johnston. Did you have sources in Alpha 66?

Mr. Halley. Yes, at times there were sources in Alpha 66.

Mr. Johnston. Did you have sources in SNFE?

Mr. Halley. At times, yes.

Mr. Johnston. Did you have sources, in the time period we are talking about, November '63 through the spring of 1964?

Mr. Halley. Well, I would have to say the probability is high that we had some sort of a source in that group, but I'd have to go back, you know, and check the record, and it would have to be researched, but my recollection to that is we would have sources in that group one way or another.

Mr. Johnston. Are you aware of a Cuban exile organization or anti-Castro organization called the Christian Democratic Movement, or MDC?

Mr. Halley. Yes, I am.

Mr. Johnston. Did you have sources in MDC?

Mr. Halley. Yes, we did.

Mr. Johnston. And in November of 1963, do you recall who was the leadership of MDC?

Mr. Halley. Off the top of my head, no, but you know there is a book, we put out a book at that time which was a [illegible]'s work, of all of the anti-Castro groups that were located in Miami, and the [illegible] are still with me, [illegible] privately. There were 250 some-odd exile groupings, and we

didn't have all 250 penetrated, if you really want to know the answer to that. We'll have to get the book, look up the dates, and try to see who the leadership were.

Mr. Johnston. Does that book contain the names of the leadership?

Mr. Halley. Yes. In most of the cases it contains the names of the major leaders.

Mr. Johnston. Did you have that book at approximately the timeperiod of November '63 through December '63?

Mr. Halley. The book was put out and revised several times. I just have trouble coming into specific dates.

Mr. Johnston. I appreciate that fact. I understand it.

Mr. Halley. There is just a mass of information on these things now coming out, and the only way I know to answer you in a prudent manner is to say that there was such a group. [illegible] steer you to the information. You know, we can look it up for you.

Mr. Johnston. Did you know who Dr. Portell-Villa was, [illegible] Portell-Villa?

Mr. Halley. [illegible] or [illegible]?

Mr. Johnston. [illegible].

Mr. Halley. [illegible], no, I do not.

Mr. Johnston. [illegible] source crypt of [illegible] and I will show you [illegible] that specification WAVE cable 0455, 4/7/1961.

(The Witness reads the document.)

Mr. Hailey. No, I don't. You know, the cryptonym AMKNOB rings a bell with me. I am familiar with the cryptonym. What specifically AMKNOB 1 is I can't tell you. REading the contents of this message, you know, this is a message dated 4 December '63, I would say that we got a message in secret writing via the mail from some source in Cuba, and he is giving this information.

Who he is, what reliability we placed on a particular source --

Mr. Johnston. That's what I'm asking you.

Mr. Hailey. what access he had and so forth, I couldn't tell you. We'd have to, you know, get the file. I would have to read it and see what the file says.

Mr. Johnston. And in connection with the assassination, President Kennedy, when you got information like that, you viewed your responsibility as what?

Mr. Hailey. Essentially putting it to headquarters, [illegible] was the focal point for pulling together all kinds of data that were dealing with the [illegible] and others.

Mr. Johnston. And again the substance of this is a source in Cuba reporting to you on possibly seeing Oswald, possible Cuban assassinations.

Mr. Hailey. That is the deduction I come to by reading their message. I don't want you to hold me to this, and [illegible]

will get the file and it says that this was an SW message from a guy in Mexico or something. I'm just reading a message and deductive analysis of what I know the case to have been at the time.

Mr. Johnston. Well, that's a correct statement of the message, is that right?

Mr. Halley. Yes, I'd have to go on the basis that we recorded material accurately. Therefore, by the way this message is written, by analysis I am having to conclude that it was a source inside Cuba.

Mr. Johnston. Then I put to you the question in regard to your previous testimony about tapping sources in Cuba, although you were getting messages out of Cuba, you recall no action being taken through the WAVE station to tap sources in Cuba.

Mr. Halley. Now, with a message like this it is conceivable. You'd have to look back at the file, and where there are additional questions, you know, like who are these people, you try to clarify the reporting that you are receiving, but I can't clarify that off the top of my head. The only thing I could suggest is to go back to the file.

Mr. Johnston. Let me show you also Director Cable [illegible] which WAVE got, dated 30 November 1963. WAVE got an [illegible] of it.

Do you have any recollection of either receiving that [illegible]

or of receiving that information?

Mr. Halley. I would have to say because of the indicator on here, the communication system was very reliable, that this message was received, because that's what it shows, but I personally have no recollection of this message.

Mr. Johnston. Could WAVE have made a contribution to that report?

Mr. Halley. Well, again, I have to go back in the first. It says the above is from a KMULSER diplomat. I assume that that was from a Mexican diplomat. Italian?

Then that would determine whether we could have made a contribution. There was a time when we in WAVE had as recruited agents Mexican and Italian diplomats in Havana. That cryptonym doesn't ring any bells with me. Now you have to go back and look it up, look in the file, and that would tell you whether we were running the guy or not.

Mr. Johnston. Is that the only evaluation you could have made?

Mr. Halley. Yes, looking at this, I'd say that's the only evaluation we could have made, but there is one other possibility. Here is a Cuban aircraft. It might be that some of the monitoring of communications that we had in the exile groups [illegible] might have had some contribution [illegible] to make to it.

Mr. Johnston. For verifying the flight?

Mr. Halley. Or what was the message, how was it sent, what was the text of the message.

Senator Schweiker. What was your relationship with a group called the Free Cuba Committee that I believe was organ[illegible] through the Mullen Company here in Washington?

Mr. Halley. Could you give me some additional informati[illegible]

Was this Bethel, Paul Bethel, the Free Cuba Committee?

Senator Schweiker. Well, again I believe Mrs. Luce was involved with this Committee as well, and there were some others.

Who is Paul Bethel?

Mr. Halley. Paul Bethel was an American who had been employed by [illegible] USIA at one time, and later came to Miami and was very active in one of these Cuban --

Senator Schweiker. Well, I'm not sure. It might have been. I don't have all the names.

Mr. Halley. Well, the Free Cuba Committee, as such, with something to go with it, doesn't strike a response.

Senator Schweiker. Well, would you, in the operation, that you recall, would you have any association with them [illegible]?

Mr. Halley. No, I have to say no, and the reason I [illegible] some of these other names, we were constantly getting [illegible] from [illegible] people.

Senator Schweiker. And there were all kinds of Cuban Committees.

Mr. Halley. That's right, and therefore, unless there is a name that goes with it, I have trouble dredging it out.

Senator Schweiker. All right.

I meant, did your work involve any working relationship to the Mullen Company in Washington?

Did you use them in any relationship at all?

Mr. Halley. No, my knowledge of the Mullen Company doesn't start until about 1972.

Senator Schweiker. Okay, I'll let somebody else handle that.

Now about the Fair Play for Cuba Committee? What, under your program, what role or relationship forgetting Oswald [illegible] did you have with them since they obviously had some foreign intelligence relationship?

Mr. Halley. None. In other words, we felt that that was an organization that really of interest to the FBI.

Senator Schweiker. However, you did have a counter[illegible] [illegible] section.

Mr. Halley. Yes, we did have a counterintelligence section, but not [illegible] against those kinds of groups. [illegible] counterintelligence section was primarily concerned [illegible] the [illegible] kinds of things, [illegible] the infiltration of Cuban agents on those boats and other forms, like the [illegible]

American flight coming into the United States, and the refugees coming to identify agents on that, identify agents who might be trying to penetrate our paramilitary teams or one of our collection of operations.

We also were looking at Cuban intelligence officers who were stationed overseas, in other words, could our debriefing of knowledgeable people result in our identifying, let's say, the DGI guy in Mexico City or in Madrid? We could then mount an operation on the basis of that to recruit him, to maintain him in place as a source within the Cuban intelligence service. So it was that kind of counterintelligence approach.

You know, as the head of the Cuban Service, [illegible] at the time, you know, people would come out and say I know him, we would look at that and see whether we could use it.

Senator Schweiker. I have just a few small ones, and then I'd like to ask you for some advice off the record, would you just give us some guidance.

On the record here, how about an organization called CUSA, Conservatives, U.S.A. I believe they were an anti-[illegible] group, and they did own some boats in paramilitary raids.

Mr. Halley. That doesn't ring a bell.

Senator Schweiker. In one of the ships or one of the boats was called the CUSA.

Does that ring any bell at all?

Mr. Halley. I don't know that they were, you know, we

tied in to say the CIA.

No, that doesn't ring any bells with me.

Senator Schweiker. Then there is a Paul Helowell.

Mr. Halley. He's a --

Senator Schweiker. Florida banker. He was involved in paramilitary or some kind of operations.

Mr. Halley. Well, there were two phases. Paul Helowell was involved in the Bay of Pigs operation, in cleaning up some claims that the families of one or two of the pilots had who crashed involved in the Bay of Pigs. And I would have known that through the file.

Helowell later was in touch with us at the time when I was in the Miami station, and he provided, as I recall, he had real estate interests, banks, and he helped us create some cover companies through which we bought or leased such things as dock space at marinas for boats and items like that.

Senator Schweiker. Okay.

Do you have anything else on the record?

Mr. Johnston. Just one more thing.

How major a role did you have with Paul Helowell? How many personal contacts did you have with him?

Mr. Halley. My recollection would be that I probably only met him once or twice personally, but you know, you have to understand this, at that time, our major cover in Miami was a commercial company. I was a vice president of

that company. As a result, I traveled extensively in the business social community. At that point we had one of the larger covert payrolls in South Miami, and I was a member of a number of clubs, and people like Helowell I would meet at cocktail parties or dinners, you know, or the yacht club that I belonged to or whatever, but officially, in terms of a business sense, I only recall talking with Helowell twice, I think.

Senator Schweiker. Would he look anything like that picture?

(The Witness looks at the sketch.)

Mr. Halley. No. At that time he would have been much heavier.

Mr. Johnston. Did you ever discuss the Kennedy assassination with him?

Mr. Halley. No, I wouldn't have. I wouldn't have talked about that. My recollection of the kind of things that I would have talked about with Helowell would have been the formation of a cover company, the purchase of a boat, the rental or term lease of you know large pieces of acreage for training sites and things like that. That's about what I recall of Helowell's relationship with us at the time.

Mr. Johnston. I guess I just have a little bit of trouble, and that is with your recollection of conversation with him, but you don't recall whether you talked

to McCone or Helms about a connection between the Kennedy assassination and the Cuban operation.

Mr. Halley. Well, you know, some of these things make different kinds of impact on you. I mean, Holowell was in that part of the county where we were located was an important figure. He had a bank not too far from where we were located. Many of our people did their banking with him, and so forth, and he's a name that sticks out.

Mr. Johnston. I thought that Mr. Helms and Mr. McCone would also make an impression.

Mr. Halley. Well, McCone, yes, you know, I went to [illegible] meetings with McCone in Washington and other places, and I [illegible] I don't mean this to sound blase, but a visit of the Director to a place you recall, but you don't necessarily recall the exact timeframe of it. I've had lots of visits at stations that I've been in from Directors, I've been involved in Presidential visits and Vice Presidential visits, and you know, I can tell you when the President came to Vietnam or something [illegible] date, [illegible] don't remember it.

Mr. Johnston. [illegible] you to pin down the exact date of a meeting with Mr. Helms or [illegible], but just whether you had a discussion with them on the relationship between the assassination of President Kennedy and the covert operations against Cuba.

Mr. Halley. I don't recall it.

Mr. Johnston. Is it you don't recall such a discussion, having such a discussion, or you have a recollection and your recollection is there were no discussions.

Mr. Halley. No, I don't recall such a discussion. That's what I've said several times. I assume that such discussions took place, but frankly, I don't recall them.

Senator Schweiker. All right, that's all we have. We appreciate your cooperation and your testimony. I do want to ask for some guidance off the record.

(Whereupon, at 4:50 o'clock p.m., the interview in the above-entitled matter was concluded.)

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